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This article reviews the role that normative claims about climate justice have 
played in international climate politics and traces how international society’s 
approach to equity questions has changed between the Kyoto Protocol (1997) 
and the Paris Agreement (2015). In an anarchic international environment, 
international society can be expected to prioritize order over justice, and the 
interest of the most powerful states over those of the most vulnerable states. 
Interestingly, the UN climate regime managed to establish an unusually strong 
version of distributive justice as part of its core regulatory instrument, the 
Kyoto Protocol, but this has been weakened and remodeled in the switch to 
the bottom-up logic of the Paris Agreement. As a consequence, the global 
justice debate has seen the weakening of established substantive principles 
of climate justice and the rise of a new procedural focus on how to subject 
national climate policy ambition to international scrutiny. Henry Shue’s 
admonition that the question of the fair sharing of burdens cannot be evaded 
remains relevant today, but the transition towards the Paris Agreement clearly 
shows the limitations of any effort to realize strong claims of distributive 
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Henry Shue has made a seminal contribution to the international debate about 
climate justice. By distinguishing between ‘subsistence emissions’ and ‘luxury 
emissions’ (Shue, 1992; 1993), he established the normative principle that 
emissions from poor countries should be treated differently than those from 
rich countries. Based on their historical responsibility for climate change and 
superior economic capacity, industrialised countries are morally obliged to 
take a lead in reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and supporting 
developing countries with their adaptation costs, mainly through financial and 
technological transfers. In his engagement with global climate change for well 
over two decades (Shue, 2014), Shue has put forward a carefully developed 
and powerfully argued theory of climate justice that is of direct relevance to 
the international politics of climate change. His work is located at the point 
where normative theory intersects with political reality. Unsurprisingly, given 
the often dismal state of international climate negotiations, Shue’s measured 
tone of abstract normative reasoning has occasionally given way to more 
strongly worded expressions of frustration and anger, especially when 
targeted at ‘feckless leaders’ that fail to provide leadership, most notably in 
the United States (Shue, 2011). He is, in the best sense of the word, an 
engaged normative theorist, an idealist in a world of supposed realists, but 
fully conscious of the harsh environment that an anarchical international 
society offers for anyone wishing to translate universal ethical principles into 
political action.  
 
In this article, I intend to reflect on Shue’s argument about the ‘unavoidability 
of justice’ (Shue, 1992) from the perspective of International Relations (IR) 
rather than normative theory. The IR discipline is usually concerned with the 
‘is’ of world politics, not the ‘ought’, though it should be noted that normative 
questions about ‘how should we act?’ are never too far from the surface in the 
‘practical discourses’ that make up IR theorising (Reus-Smith and Snidal, 
2008). I am interested in exploring the extent to which normative arguments 
about climate justice, and especially distributive justice, are reflected in the 
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main outcomes of international climate negotiations under the auspices of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). By 
tracing the evolution of justice elements in the climate regime from the 1997 
Kyoto Protocol to the 2015 Paris Agreement, I hope to illuminate both the 
power and limitations of justice claims in international climate politics.  
 
International relations is often portrayed as a social realm in which anarchy 
and the need to maintain order take precedence over morality and the desire 
to achieve global justice. As Hedley Bull put it in his influential framing of the 
pluralist nature of international society, ‘justice … is realisable only in a 
context of order’ (1977: 86), but ‘international order is preserved by means 
which systematically affront the most basic and widely agreed principles of 
international justice’ (1977: 91). International order in an anarchic environment 
is maintained by mechanisms (for example diplomacy, balance of power, war) 
that privilege the mighty at the expense of the weak, and they usually leave 
little room for the pursuit of higher normative ambitions. To be sure, Bull’s 
justification for the empirical and moral priority of order over justice is rooted in 
a distinctly minimalist and deeply skeptical approach to theorising 
international society, one that is strongly coloured by his Cold War experience 
(Hurrell, 2003: 26). As such, it may not adequately capture the expansion of 
human aspiration and solidarity, especially in the post-Cold War era. 
However, even those that point to the recent growth of solidarist forms of 
international cooperation usually concede that this process remains weak and 
incomplete. 
 
If there are any areas of international life that are particularly open to the 
influence of normative reasoning, then global environmental politics ought to 
be one of them. After all, environmental stewardship became a fundamental 
international norm mainly because of norm entrepreneurship by 
environmental campaigners, scientists and progressive state leaders (Falkner 
and Buzan, 2017). Originating in diverse normative initiatives in the 19th 
century and gradually morphing into a global movement in the 20th century, 
environmentalism gave rise to an enlarged agenda of global governance 
along solidarist lines. But to become politically salient and universally 
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accepted, international environmental politics has followed primarily a 
‘common fate’ logic that emphasises common interests rather than a justice-
based conception of common duties. It is in this sense that environmentalism 
as practiced by international society has not progressed much beyond a 
pluralist logic of international coexistence. Powerful vested interests continue 
to hold back environmental protection efforts, whether at the national or 
international level. The same can also be said of the international politics of 
climate change, which saw a strong push for solidarist solutions in its Kyoto 
Protocol phase but has reverted to a more pluralist and de-centralised 
approach in the Paris Agreement (Falkner, 2017).  
 
The rise and fall of the Kyoto Protocol’s equity approach 
 
Demands for fairness in sharing the burden of climate change mitigation have 
been a central feature of the international climate negotiations right from their 
start in the late 1980s (for a history of the negotiations, see Gupta 2014). 
Developing countries and civil society groups, in particular, have routinely 
referred to historical responsibilities and the unequal distribution of climate 
impacts as the basis for determining the distribution of international 
commitments. Such appeals to global justice are not uncommon when the 
weak confront the strong. What is remarkable, however, is the unusual degree 
to which distributive justice principles were incorporated into the UNFCCC 
regime, especially against the background of the Third World’s unsuccessful 
campaign for a New International Economic Order (Hurrell and Sengupta, 
2012: 467-8). By adopting ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities’ (CBDR), the UNFCCC established differentiation as 
the core principle for defining how countries ought to reduce emissions and 
contribute to international climate finance and technology transfer. The first-
ever climate treaty thus incorporated elements of industrialised countries’ 
historical responsibility and ability to pay into its burden sharing arrangement, 
though it did not operationalise how common and differentiated 
responsibilities would be balanced.  
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The 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC went one step further and 
established a strict divide between industrialised (Annex I) and developing 
(non-Annex I) countries, with only the former committing to legally binding and 
quantified emission reduction targets. In less than ten years of international 
negotiations, developing countries had thus scored one of their biggest 
diplomatic victories. They had pushed the mitigation burden entirely onto 
developed economies while exempting themselves from any emission cuts, at 
least until the end of the treaty’s first commitment period (2008-12). In this 
sense, at least, the Kyoto treaty fulfilled Shue’s normative principle that poor 
countries should not be restricted in their ability to increase ‘subsistence’ 
emissions as part of their developmental effort.  
 
Other elements of the treaty were more problematic, however. By prioritising 
climate change mitigation over adaptation, Kyoto did not do enough to prevent 
significant losses for the most vulnerable countries (Gardiner, 2011); its 
provisions on capacity building and technology transfer remained 
underdeveloped (Okereke and Coventry, 2016: 838); and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), a flexibility instrument that allows developed 
countries to fund emission reduction projects in developing countries and in 
exchange claim credits towards their own commitments, lowered rich 
countries’ mitigation costs but risked delaying the transition to alternative 
forms of energy (Shue, 2014: 217-23). Still, despite its many flaws, the Kyoto 
Protocol remains an outstanding success of solidarist ambition in international 
climate politics, especially when measured against the conservative standards 
of international diplomacy (Falkner, 2017).  
 
As soon as the Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005, its fragile 
compromise on climate justice began to fall apart. Three recent shifts in the 
international politics of climate change have contributed to this unraveling of 
Kyoto-style equity.  
 
First, as emerging economies gained in economic strength throughout the 
2000s, they saw their GHG emissions rise steadily in both absolute terms and 
as a share of global emissions. China’s emissions doubled between 1990 and 
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2005, and soon after the country overtook the United States to become the 
world’s largest GHG emitter. As industrialised countries’ emissions began to 
peak and even decline in the 2010s, it was emerging economies such as 
China and India that increasingly came to determine the future trajectory in 
global emissions. This transformation in the global emissions profile had 
profound consequences for how international climate responsibility would be 
defined in the climate regime. The binary logic of Kyoto’s burden-sharing 
arrangement seemed increasingly out of touch with global economic reality, 
and populous and economically dynamic developing countries could no longer 
seek cover behind their status as non-Annex I countries. Over time, they 
came to accept the need for some form of differentiation between themselves 
and poorer developing countries, a process that eventually led to the 
emergence of the BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) as a third 
major block in the post-Kyoto climate negotiations (Hochstetler and Milkoreit, 
2014). 
 
Second, and closely connected with the shift in global emissions, the United 
States and other industrialised countries stepped up their efforts to contest the 
strong equity dimensions of the Kyoto Protocol. The US, in particular, was 
adamantly opposed to the Kyoto Protocol’s binary logic that exempted all 
developing countries from tackling their rising emissions. As the negotiations 
on a successor agreement got underway in 2007, American negotiators 
consistently emphasised the need to base the global mitigation effort on the 
widest possible cooperation of all countries. By the time of the Copenhagen 
conference (COP-15) in 2009, which failed to adopt a post-Kyoto treaty, the 
US had succeeded in agreeing with the BASIC group the contours of a new 
international approach that replaced strict differentiation with a more balanced 
approach of mitigation contributions by all major emitters. It was on the basis 
of this new framework that COP-17 in Durban established the new negotiation 
mandate for the Paris Agreement. In fact, the ‘Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action’ failed to make any explicit reference to the UNFCCC norms of ‘equity’ 
or ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’. The combination of US power 
and intransigence had finally succeeded in shifting the international 
consensus away from Kyoto-style equity solutions. As Todd Stern, US Special 
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Envoy on Climate Change, had made clear during the Durban conference, ‘if 
equity’s in, then we’re out’ (Pickering, et al., 2012).  
 
And third, as the international community began to prepare the ground for the 
new architecture of the Paris Agreement, non-state actors assumed a more 
important role as contributors to the mitigation effort and providers of 
transnational climate governance outside the UNFCCC climate regime. The 
growing involvement of a wide variety of non-state actors has been noted at 
least since the early 2000s, with municipalities, cities, private actors and civil 
society organisations taking on voluntary emission reduction targets and 
providing governance functions for both mitigation and adaptation (Bulkeley, 
Andonova, et al., 2014). The contributions that non-state actors can make 
have also been increasingly recognised within the inter-governmental regime, 
and the UN and other international organisations have embarked on 
sustained orchestration efforts to mobilise nonstate climate actions (Hale and 
Roger 2014).  
 
The resulting de-centralisation of global climate action raises important 
question about how climate justice can be debated and negotiated in a 
climate governance context that is characterised by a proliferation of actors 
and governance levels. The research literature has begun to develop new 
accounts of emerging transnational conceptions of climate justice, for 
example in the context of urban climate governance (Bulkeley, Edwards, et 
al., 2014). These emerging approaches try to take into account structural 
inequalities and injustices that exist not just between nation-states but also 
within societies, and they also move beyond international distributional conflict 
towards questions of participation and recognition. They raise questions about 
how to apply the principle of differentiation to non-state actors, such as the 
fossil fuel industry, and how to account for the different responsibilities and 
contributions of the growing variety of actors involved in climate governance 
(Frumhoff and Heede, 2015). 
 
Redefining global climate justice: The new logic of the Paris Agreement  
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The three trends identified above have led to a partial unraveling of the 
substantive justice foundations on which the international climate regime has 
been built. Climate justice has not been written out of the regime, but the 
connections between the UNFCCC governance architecture and demands for 
climate justice, such as those made by Shue, have been weakened. By 
moving away from emission reduction targets and timetables that are 
internationally negotiated and legally binding, and by diluting the 
differentiation principle as it existed in Kyoto, international society has created 
greater uncertainty about whether and how rich countries are meeting their 
climate obligations towards poorer ones. At the same time, however, the 
move towards an expanded global governance framework for climate change, 
in terms of the diffusion of climate responsibilities to emerging economies as 
well as to non-state actors, marks a strengthening of international society’s 
and world society’s commitment to tackling both the global mitigation and 
adaptation challenge. How well does the Paris Agreement deal with this 
changing framework for addressing climate justice concerns?  
 
The Paris Agreement1 has advanced global climate policy in a number of 
ways. By setting a global temperature target of ‘well below 20C’, with the 
aspiration to ‘limit the temperature increase to 1.50C’, the international 
community has set a clear goal that allows us to calculate the world’s 
remaining carbon budget (even though we have now nearly exhausted this 
budget, as Shue argues in his ‘Breakthrough’ article (2018: x)). The 
agreement also includes a long-term goal of reaching global peaking of GHG 
emissions ‘as soon as possible’ and achieving net zero emissions in the 
second half of the 21st century, which sends a stronger signal to global 
markets about the required direction and pace of decarbonisation.  
 
The treaty’s main innovation can be found in the move away from 
internationally negotiated emission targets towards a bottom-up structure of 
nationally determined contributions (NDCs) (Falkner, 2016). This shift has 
allowed the international community to sidestep the thorny distributional 
                                            
1 Paris Agreement, available at: 
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf.  
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conflict that had bedeviled the UNFCCC process for over two decades. The 
equity norm of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ had only 
established the vague principle that some form of differentiation was needed 
in dividing the global mitigation burden, but countries never managed to agree 
on a precise formula for translating this principle into quantified emission 
reduction targets for each and every country. In a world of shifting emissions 
profiles and contested notions of historical responsibility, the creators of the 
Paris Agreement opted for a more inclusive but voluntary approach that 
spreads mitigation responsibility widely while allowing each country to set its 
own emission targets. To balance this de-centralised approach with a certain 
degree of international accountability, the Paris Agreement also established 
an international framework for reviewing and revising national pledges on a 
five-yearly basis, with countries having to report on the implementation of their 
NDCs and increase the level of national ambition over time.  
 
Given the profound shift in its underlying regulatory approach, the Paris 
Agreement was bound to raise a number of difficult questions for the climate 
justice agenda. Early concern focused on the omission of references to equity 
and differentiation in the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, which framed 
the negotiations on the Paris accord. At the insistence of developing 
countries, however, the CBDR norm was reinserted into the working draft for 
the treaty. Unsurprisingly, questions of equity loomed large over the entire 
negotiation process as developing countries tried to reintroduce a stronger 
justice dimension, fearful of the consequences for equity if Northern proposals 
for a more flexible and bottom-up model would be adopted. In the end, the 
preamble of the agreement included a reference to the ‘concept of climate 
justice’, although the added qualifier that it is important only ‘for some’ clearly 
signals its contested nature.  
 
There can be little doubt that the treaty marks a profound shift in the way 
climate justice is approached in international climate politics. Whereas in the 
past the debate revolved around how to balance historical responsibilities with 
different economic circumstances in defining mitigation targets, the new 
bottom up structure avoids any attempt to resolve this core distributional 
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conflict. Differentiation is still present as a guiding principle: the Paris 
Agreement accepts that emissions peaking will take longer for developing 
countries to achieve; acknowledges the special situation that the poorest 
countries find themselves in; and makes frequent reference to sustainable 
development and eradicating poverty as the context for defining the global 
response (Okereke and Coventry, 2016: 840). But this does not alter 
Rajamani’s (2012) assessment that differentiation has been ‘on the wane’ 
ever since it reached its zenith in the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
The international climate regime has moved away from an internationally 
agreed formula for allocating fair and equitable mitigation burdens and instead 
leaves it to the Parties to define for themselves how they intend to meet their 
own interpretation of climate justice. It is now through a regular international 
review process that the international community seeks to subject national 
claims to equitable mitigation efforts to a transparent form of international 
scrutiny and contestation (Chan, 2016: 298), potentially relying also on civil 
society groups to perform so-called ‘equity reviews’ as part of the 
Agreement’s new deliberative process (Shue, 2018: x).2 Paris thus represents 
a weakening of the climate regime’s substantive justice dimensions and a 
greater procedural focus on how to review and ratchet up nationally 
determined mitigation pledges.  
 
To be sure, the international debate on climate justice has made some minor 
advances in other areas. Given that a certain degree of global warming is now 
inevitable and will result in rising sea levels and extreme weather patterns 
whatever mitigation efforts will be undertaken, developing countries have long 
demanded that climate change-related loss and damage should be 
recognised formally as part of the climate regime. They and their allies in 
global civil society scored a first success with the creation of the Warsaw 
International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate 
Change Impacts at COP-19 in 2013 (Vanhala and Hestbaek, 2016: 112). But 
as so often in the protracted climate negotiations, success for the Global 
                                            
2 For an example of existing ‘equity reviews by NGOs, see 
www.civilsocietyreview.org.  
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South came at the cost of legal ambiguity and weak commitments. While 
developing countries saw loss and damage as leading to liability and 
compensation, developed countries framed the issue as a more 
straightforward matter of adaptation, rejecting explicit promises to make 
compensation payments. It was the latter perspective that gained the upper 
hand in the Paris Agreement, which explicitly excludes liability and 
compensation in the context of loss and damage (paragraph 51 of the 
decision commenting on article 8 of the Agreement that mentions the Warsaw 
Mechanism for Loss and Damage; Pottier et al., 2017: 39). The Warsaw 
Mechanism is thus likely to emphasise a more conventional agenda of 
promoting resilience, risk management and scientific cooperation rather than 
financial payments to address historical responsibilities.  
 
Conclusions: Justice and Order in International Climate Politics 
 
As this brief review of the justice dimension in the evolving climate regime 
shows, normative claims regarding the distribution of the climate change 
mitigation and adaptation burden have played a central role throughout the 
history of the international negotiations. Both developing countries and civil 
society groups have fought hard to inject principles of distributive justice into 
the climate regime. The Kyoto Protocol came closest to realising some of the 
key elements of Shue’s theory of climate justice, mainly by exempting 
developing countries from the need to reduce GHG emissions. Other 
provisions, on adaptation finance and technology transfers, fell short of 
Shue’s distributive justice demands, but the Kyoto Protocol stands out as a 
remarkably strong instrument for turning normative claims into specific, if 
inadequate, regulatory provisions. In this sense, justice has indeed proved to 
be an ‘unavoidable’ part of the international politics of climate change (Shue, 
1992).  
 
But far from providing the basis for strengthening and going beyond the 
initially agreed equity formula, the precarious international compromise 
underpinning the Kyoto Protocol has gradually unraveled in more recent 
years. In response to the dramatic shift in global emissions profiles, which 
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saw emerging economies from the Global South shoulder ever greater 
responsibility for current and future emissions, the Kyoto Protocol’s ‘firewall’ 
between industrialised and developing countries has been replaced by a new, 
more balanced, but ultimately voluntary approach of bottom-up national 
pledges. In the Paris Agreement, major emitters from both sides of this divide 
have strengthened their commitment to preventing runaway global warming, 
but without trying to negotiate in advance how to divide up the mitigation 
burden. In doing so, they have weakened not only the differentiation principle 
at the heart of the UNFCCC regime but also the role that distributive justice 
can play in determining future climate action. In as much as there is a trade 
off between justice and order in international climate politics, powerful states 
within international society have successfully shifted the balance towards the 
latter. Normative contestation continues in international climate politics, but 
the highpoint of basing climate action on firm principles of distributive justice 
appears to have passed.  
 
To be sure, the notion of an eternal struggle between international order and 
global justice is far too simplistic to capture the complex reality of how 
normative claims have infused and shaped international climate politics. What 
we have witnessed in the negotiations leading to the Paris Agreement is not 
just a revision, and partial rejection, of established approaches to distributive 
justice, but also a reframing of the normative debate. This is in part about a 
move from negotiating global towards local justice solutions (Pottier, 2017). It 
also signals the rise of a new procedural approach to embedding justice 
concerns in global climate governance, which engages a wider range of 
actors – states in first instance, but also firms and civil society groups – in 
ongoing struggles to review and revise national policy ambition.  
 
By creating what could prove to be a politically more acceptable and robust 
regime, international society has also increased the chances of the remaining 
elements of climate justice to be implemented and expanded. And as the 
global transition towards a low-carbon economic future picks up speed and 
green energy sources become more readily available, some of the early 
distributional disputes, such as over subsistence emissions, may lose their 
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urgency. But this presumes that the low-carbon transition is proceeding at a 
sufficient pace and on a global scale, and that other distributional conflicts do 
not hold back the collective effort. Shue is therefore right to stand by his core 
claim that ‘the politically crucial question of the fair sharing of burdens cannot 
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